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Abstract—The Smart Grid (SG) is widely considered to be
the informationization of the power grid. Advanced Metering
Infrastructure (AMI) has been regarded as a key component of
the SG. The critical role of AMI in the SG has made this system
a privileged target of cyber attacks. Consequently, AMI security
is of very high importance for the security of the SG. For this
reason, Key Management has been identified as one of the most
challenging topics in AMI development because of the great scale
of SG and dynamism of connected clients with respect to tariff
programs. This paper proposes a new efficient Multi-group Key
management for AMI (MK-AMI) to secure data communications
in the smart grid. It is a novel key management scheme that can
support unicast, multicast and broadcast communications. An
analysis of security and performance, and a comparison of our
scheme with recently proposed schemes illustrate that MK-AMI
achieves efficient key management and induces low storage and
communications overheads compared to existing solutions.
Index Terms—Smart Grid (SG); Advanced Metering Infras-
tructure (AMI); Cyber Security; Key Management.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart Grid (SG), also called intelligent grid, intelligrid
or futuregrid refers to the next generation power grid in
which the electricity distribution and management is upgraded
by incorporating advanced two-way flows of electricity and
information and pervasive computing capabilities for improved
control, agility, efficiency, reliability, economy and safety [1].
A practical example of the benefits of introducing the smart
grid includes the greater availability of electricity to homes at
a lower cost, and the integration of distributed and renewable
power generation such as local solar [2].
Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) has been regarded
as a key component of the smart grid. It inherits the two-way
communication capability of smart grid and introduces new
opportunities for consumers and suppliers: it is responsible
for collecting consumer’s time-based data and transmitting
them to the AMI host system, and it is also responsible for
implementing price signals and control commands to perform
necessary control actions [3]. AMI is a privileged target
for security attacks with potentially great damage against
infrastructures and privacy. Consequently, security is one of
the most challenging topics in AMI development
Some of the key AMI security requirements are described
below [3]:
• Confidentiality- Requirement that customer’s sensitive
data is accessible only to authorized systems, customers
do not want unauthorized people or marketing firms to
know how much energy they are using, what their pattern
of energy usage is, or other energy-related information.
• Integrity- Requirement that the transmitted data from
smart meters to the utility as well as control commands
(such as Demand Response DR mechanisms that enable
customers to cut down energy usage at peak times for ex-
ample) are authentic, complete, and without unauthorized
deletions, modifications, or additions.
• Availability- Requirement that data (informations and
control commands) is accessible by the smart meters and
the utility whenever they need it.
• Accountability (non-repudiation)- Requirement that the
entities receiving the data will not subsequently deny
receiving and vice versa.
To meet these security requirements, cryptographic coun-
termeasures must be deployed. However, cryptographic mech-
anisms for AMI require also an efficient key management.
Inadequate key management can result in possible key dis-
closure to attackers, and even jeopardizing the entire goal of
secure communications in AMI. Therefore, key management
is a critical process to ensure the secure operation of AMI.
Several key management schemes (KMS) have been pro-
posed [4]–[12], but none of them can completely satisfy the
security requirements mentioned previously. Hence, we pro-
pose a new key management scheme based on an efficient and
scalable multi-group key graph technique to secure unicast,
multicast, and broadcast communications in a SG network
while achieving the security requirements of AMI.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We
discuss related works in Section II. In Section III we present
our multi-group key management scheme. A security and
performance analysis is performed in Section IV. Finally, we
draw our conclusions in Section V.
II. RELATED WORKS
In recent years, several schemes have been proposed to
secure communications for AMI in smart grid. According to
[12], key management has been identified as a fundamental
security challenge in an AMI.
A key distribution and management scheme for large cus-
tomer networks to achieve authentication, privacy and data
confidentiality in AMI is proposed by Kamto et al. in [4].
Yan et al. [5] proposed an integrated approach in which
trust services, integrity and data privacy could be provided by
mutual authentications. In [6], Li and Cao proposed a one-
time signature scheme to address the problem of preventing
message forgery attacks in multicast communications. The
proposed scheme presents a significant reduction in the storage
and communication overhead, but only focuses on communi-
cation integrity and do not address confidentiality.
Nicanfar et al. [7] developed a key management protocol for
data communication between the utility server and customers’
smart meters based on the concept of ID-Based public/private
key pair model [14]. Although the proposed key management
protocol aims to reduce the computation overheads, the syn-
chronization process still demands considerable computation
efforts. Wu and Zhou [8] combines symmetric key technique
based on the Needham-Schroeder authentication protocol [15]
and elliptic curve public key technique [16] to provide a
novel key management scheme for smart grid assuring strong
security, fault-tolerance, efficiency and scalability. In the work
of Xia and Wang [9], the authors showed that Wu and Zhou
scheme [8] is vulnerable to the man-in-the-middle attack and
proposed an improvement for this scheme based on a trusted
third party. However, these two schemes do not support secure
multicast communications.
A key management scheme is proposed by Liu et al. [10]
to secure unicast, multicast, and broadcast communications
in AMI. Authors pretend that this scheme was based on the
key graph management approach [17] but it suffers from a
lack of scalability due to inefficient key management that
results in non-negligible communication overhead for such
a large-scale system. Moreover, we found that Liu’s et al.
scheme is not tolerant to packet loss. Wan et al. [11] proposed
an improvement for Liu’s et al. scheme (called SKM) that
combines an adapted identity-based cryptosystem [18] and
One-way Function Trees (OFT) approach [19] for multicast
key management. The use of an OFT separately for each
DR project (DR projects are programs designed to decrease
electricity consumption or shift it from on-peak to off-peak
periods depending on consumers’ preferences) results in non-
negligible overhead for key storage.
Recently, Nabeel et et al. [12] proposed a PUF-based key
management scheme for advanced metering infrastructures.
Although, their scheme supports decentralized key manage-
ment, the scheme requires a PUF hardware device.
III. MK-AMI: EFFICIENT MULTI-GROUP KEY
MANAGEMENT FOR AMI
We introduce a new scalable and efficient key management
scheme that we call efficient Multi-group Key management
scheme for secure communications in AMI systems (MK-
AMI). It is based on a novel multi-group key graph structure
that supports the management of multiple Demand Response
projects simultaneously for each customer.
A. Assumptions
1) The AMI complies with the architecture illustrated in Fig.
1 and involves Smart Meters (SMs) and Distributed Energy
Resources at the user end, communication networks to connect
two ends, Meter Data Management Systems (MDMS) and the
means to integrate the collected data into software application
systems at the utility end.
2) A specific default DR project is mandatory for all users
of the SG. This default DR project will be used by MDMS to
broadcast control messages or informations to all customers.
3) Except the mandatory DR project, any user can join or
leave any DR project at any time.
B. Initialization of the KMS
Let us consider a set of n smart meters. Initially:
• A specific method of securely exchanging cryptographic
keys over a public channel is used to establish individual
keys {k1, ..., kn} between the MDMS and SMs. Theses
individual keys (refreshed periodically) will be used to
secure unicast communications, and to generate the multi-
group key graph for secure multicast communications.
• The MDMS must generate a group key GK0 (refreshed
periodically) for the default DR project. This key will
be generated and transmitted through secure channels for
each SM, and will be used to secure messages transmitted
in broadcast mode.
In Table I, we summarize the terminology that we will use
throughout the remaining of this paper.
C. Group Key Management
In our solution, we propose a secure, efficient and scalable
management of group keys in AMI. To address the scalability
issue, key graph techniques can be used. Specifically, we
adopt a variation of OFC (One-way Function Chain) [20]. We
consider that the MDMS and all users individually compute
all the keys of interior nodes using a pseudo-random function.
However, the group keys are always chosen by the MDMS.
Moreover, as the users can subscribe to multiple DR projects
at the same time, an intuitive solution is to use a key tree for
each DR project. But, this naive application of OFC may be
costly and induces a non-negligible key storage overhead.
Fig. 1: Basic Components of an AMI System
TABLE I: Notation Table
Notation Description
H(.) A One-way hash function
n Number of SMs
mi Number of the ith DR project members
hi Height of ith OFC tree hi = log2(mi)
Npr Number of DR projects
Nsub(ui) Number of DR projects to which subscribes user ui
Home DR(ui) First DR project to which subscribes user ui
set(ui) Set of DR projects to which subscribes user ui
DRi The ith DR project
GKi Group key of DRi
Path(ui)
All keys corresponding to the nodes in the path from
ui’s individual key to Home DR(ui) Group key
right(ki) Right children of node ki in the tree
left(ki) Left children of node ki in the tree
Enc(M,k) Message M encrypted with key k
A→ B : M A sends a message M to B
To reduce storage and communication costs in key manage-
ment, we propose a novel multi-group key graph structure.
1) Multi-group Key Graph Structure: Our multi-group key
graph structure can be modeled as shown in Fig. 2: in the
lower level, each OFC tree represents a set of users with the
same first DR project subscription, the leaf node of the tree is a
user’s individual key and tree’s root is the DR project’s group
key. The graph in the upper level represents combinations of
root keys for users subscribing to multiple DR projects at the
same time. Our key structure has the following properties:
• A user only belongs to one OFC tree in the multi-
group key graph corresponding to his Home DR project.
He holds a copy of his leaf secret key and all keys
corresponding to the nodes in the path from his leaf to
the root in this tree,
• A user has all group keys of the other DR projects to
which he is subscribed,
• if a user leaves his Home DR project and remains
subscribed to one or more DR projects, he will shift to a
new OFC tree. These features ensure that a user will not
subscribe and pay for the same project multiple times.
2) Rekeying operations: In our solution, when a user
subscribes or leaves a DR project, rekeying consists of 3
operations: joining/leaving an OFC tree, shifting among trees.
a) Leave procedure: The leave procedure deals with the case
when a user unsubscribes from a DR project (ui leaves DRj).
Let φj = {ul/ul subscribed to DRj},
Let Xjk = {ul/ul ∈ φj and Home DR (ul) = DRk},
Let ωk = {ul/ul ∈ Xjk and DRk ∈ set(ui)},
Let δk = {ul/ul /∈ Xjk and DRk ∈ set(ui)}.
• Case 1: We consider a user who subscribed to one or
multiple DR projects and leaves his Home DR project: The
MDMS updates and renews keys according to Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 : Update keys when user leaves Home DR
Function leaveHomeDR (ui, DRj) ;
1: Apply standard OFC approach in DRj tree to update GKj
(GK′j represents the new group key);
2: If Nsub(ui) = 1 :
3: MDMS → Xjk :⋃
Enc(Enc(GK′j , GKk), GKj)
4: Else :
5: MDMS → ωk :
Enc(Enc(GK′j , kright(GKk)), GKj)
Enc(Enc(GK′j , kleft(GKk)), GKj)
6: MDMS → δk :⋃
Enc(Enc(GK′j , GKk), GKj)
7: Shift user ui to OFC tree corresponding to his second
subscription DRx using standard OFC apporach (without
updating key GKx that ui already has)
• Case 2: We consider a user who is subscribed to multiple
DR projects and leaves one DR project which is not his
Home DR project (ui leaves DRj) The MDMS updates
and renews keys according to Algorithm 2.
Let DRx = Home DR(ui),
Let ψk = {ul/ul ∈ ωk and DRk 6= DRx},
Let pii = {kl/kl = right(kc) or kl = left(kc), kc ∈
Path(ui)}.
Algorithm 2: Update keys when user leaves DR project
Function leaveDR (ui, DRj) ;
1: Update GKj (GK′j is the new group key);
2: MDMS → Xjj :
Enc(GK′j , kright(GKj))
Enc(GK′j , kleft(GKj))
3: MDMS → Xjx :⋃
kα∈pii
Enc(Enc(GK′j , kα), GKj)
4: MDMS → ψk :
Enc(Enc(GK′j , kright(GKk)), GKj)
Enc(Enc(GK′j , kleft(GKk)), GKj)
5: MDMS → δk :⋃
Enc(Enc(GK′j , GKk), GKj)
Example: Let us consider the key graph in Fig. 2. When
u1 (subscribed to DR1, DR2 and DR3) leaves DR2 which
Fig. 2: Example of our multi-group key graph structure
is not his Home DR: (a) update GK ′2 for users in X22:
MDMS→ {u8, u9, u10} : Enc(GK ′2, k8−10) (1)
MDMS→ {u11, u12, u13} : Enc(GK ′2, k11−13) (2)
(b) update GK ′2 for users in X21 using a double encryption
to ensure that only users susbscribing to DR2 can obtain
the new key (suppose u6 and u7 subscribed to DR2) :
MDMS→ {u6, u7} : Enc(Enc(GK ′2, k6−7), GK2) (3)
(c) update GK ′2 for users in ψk:
MDMS→ ψ3 : Enc(Enc(GK ′2, k14−15), GK2) (4)
MDMS→ ψ3 : Enc(Enc(GK ′2, k16−17), GK2) (5)
(d) update GK ′2 for users in δk:
MDMS→ δ4 : Enc(Enc(GK ′2, GK4), GK2) (6)
b) Join procedure: Algorithm 3 deals with the case when
a user subscribes to a new DR project (ui joins DRj).
Algorithm 3 : Update keys when user joins a DR project
Function joinDR (ui, DRj) ;
1: GK′j = H(GKj);
2: If Nsub(ui) ≥ 1 :
3: Send the new group key GK′j to ui ;
4: Send a notification to all users in φj about the application
of the one-way function;
5: Else :
6: Send a notification to all users in Xjk about the application
of the one-way function;
7: Apply standard OFC approach in DRj tree whithout
updating GKj .
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Security Analysis
1) Backward and forward Sercery: When a new user joins
a DR project, he cannot learn previous group keys because
he does not have access to previous group key, and hence
backward secrecy is preserved. Moreover, when a user leaves a
DR project, all affected keys will be changed and redistributed
securely which prevents the departing user from having access
to the new keys and hence forward secrecy is preserved.
2) Collusion freedom: Any set of users unsubscribed from a
set of DR projects cannot deduce the current used DR projects
keys, because all affected keys when any user leaves a DR
project will be updated and new keys are independent.
B. Performance Analysis
1) Storage Cost: We approximate the storage cost with the
number of keys stored in the MDMS/SMs (Table II).
2) Communication Cost: The number of keys to be updated
varies according to the position of the joining/leaving member.
a) Leave procedure
• Case 1: When ui leaves his Home DR project DRj (user
subscribed only to one DR project) :
comCost = (hj +Npr − 1)|K| (7)
|K| : the size of the key in bit.
• Case 2: When ui leaves his Home DR project DRj (DRk
is the new Home DR project):
comCost = (hj + 2.A+B + hk)|K|+ c (8)
A = Nsub(ui)
B = Npr −Nsub(ui)
The ” + c” term is to specify on which group key we must
apply the one-way function c = log2 (Npr).
• Case 3: When ui leaves one DR project DRj which is not
his Home DR project DRl:
comCost = (2 + hl + 2.A+B)|K| (9)
b) Join procedure
• Case 1: When ui joins his Home DR project DRj :
comCost = hj |K|+ c (10)
• Case 2: When ui joins a new DR project DRj which is not
his Home DR project DRl:
comCost = |K|+ c (11)
TABLE II: Storage Cost
Scheme Storage Overhead
MDMS SMi
Liu’s et al.,
2013 [10] n+Npr + 1 Nsub(ui) + 2
SKM+,
2014 [11] 2
Npr∑
j=1
(mj − 1) + 1
Nsub(ui)∑
j=1
(log2 mj+1)+1
MK-AMI 2
Npr∑
j=1
(mj − 1) + 1 log2 (|Home DR(ui)|)+Nsub(ui) + 1
* n is the number of SMs, Npr is the number of DR projects, mj
is the number of jth DR project members, Nsub(ui) is the number
of DR projects to which subscribes user ui.
(a) Subscribers = 30000 (b) Subscribers = 90000 (c) Subscribers = 150000
Fig. 3: Average storage cost in SMs with respect to number of subscribed DR projects
(a) DR projects = 7 (b) DR projects = 11 (c) DR projects = 15
Fig. 4: Average storage cost in SMs with respect to DR projects’ size
3) Simulation:
• Simulation Model: We consider a SG with 1 million users.
The utility provides 15 DR projects to users. We assume
that users arrival is modeled as a Poisson process with
parameter λ (users/months), and given that there are no
statistical studies of DR projects membership behavior for
the moment, we assume that membership duration in each
DR projects follows an Exponential law with parameter µ.
A typical user session starts by a join event, which can be
followed by one or more events. At the end of a membership
in a DR project, a user leaves this DR project. We will
consider a session of 24 months. Average arrival rate λ is
of 10000 users/month, and average membership duration µ
is 4 months. We will use a 128b long symmetric keys.
• Simulation Results
Storage Cost
For MDMS, the storage cost can be afforded using special
key servers. In contrast, the storage capacity of SMs is limited
to 4-12 KB [21]. Fig. 3 (a), (b) and (c) show the average
storage cost induced at SMs with respect to the number of
subscribed DR projects. We can see that in our scheme, a
SM stores fewer keys than that in SKM+ (reduction reaches
93% while number of subscribers is about 150000 and a
user can subscribe to 15 DR projects at the same time) and
little more keys than that in Liu’s et al. scheme. This can
be explained as follows: in Liu’s et al. scheme, a SM stores
one key for each subscribed DR project. In SKM+, authors
used an OFT for each DR project, the number of keys stored
will increase significantly when a user subscribes to new DR
projects. Whereas, in MK-AMI the number of subscribed DR
projects does not affect significantly the storage cost.
Fig. 4 (a), (b) and (c) show the average storage cost in SMs
with respect to DR projects’ size. In Liu’s et al. scheme, the
projects’s size does not affect significantly the storage cost,
SMs store only the group keys. Whereas,in SKM+ and MK-
AMI the DR projects’ size affects the storage cost, as the
number of users increases, the storage cost increases due to
the rise of the height of the used key trees, but SMs store
much fewer keys in MK-AMI with respect to SKM+.
Communication Cost
Fig. 5 (a) and (b) show a comparison of average communi-
cation cost per event (join/leave) with respect to the number
of subscribed DR projects at the same time. The bandwidth
overhead due for the Liu’s et al. scheme is remarkably higher
than that of our scheme because of the inefficient multicast
key management. In MK-AMI, bandwith overhead reduction
reaches 99% with respect to Liu’s et al. scheme (Fig. 5 (b)).
Note that although SKM+ has less communication overhead
than MK-AMI, but the difference is not significant.
Fig. 6 (a) and (b) show a comparison of average communi-
cation cost per event for the three schemes with respect to the
(a) Subscribers = 50000 (b) Subscribers = 150000
Fig. 5: Average communication cost by event with respect to number of DR projects
(a) DR projects = 15 (b) Zoom of (a)
Fig. 6: Average communication cost by event with respect to
DR projects’ size
DR projects’ size while fixing the number of DR projects to 15
DR projects. In Liu’s et al. scheme the bandwidth overhead
increases proportionally with the increase of the number of
subscribers. Whereas, the overhead remains much lower in
SKM+ and MK-AMI as shown in Fig. 6 (b) (the bandwidth
overhead of SKM+ and MK-AMI is too little to be seen in Fig.
6 (a)). Certainly, MK-AMI introduces extra communication
cost compared to SKM+, but this overhead is minor regarding
the overall advantages of the proposed scheme, mainly when
considering the storage cost as shown above.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a new key management scheme
for AMI in SG. MK-AMI is an efficient and scalable key
management scheme supporting unicast, multicast, as well as
broadcast communications. The proposed scheme uses a novel
multi-group key graph technique that supports the management
of multiple and dynamic Demand Response projects simulta-
neously for each customer. In addition, the proposed KMS
guarantees both forward and backward secrecy. The detailed
security analysis and performance evaluation show that MK-
AMI is secure and efficient for AMI systems in smart grid.
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